Archive for the ‘Civil Liberties’ Category

  • SB-162 Would Bar Cannabis Licensees from Using Branded Merchandise (and is Probably Unconstitutional)

    California Cannabis Industry Alert!

    Senate Bill 162 (hereafter “SB162”), currently making its way through the state legislature, would impose draconian restrictions on cannabis marketing. Specifically, it would prevent cannabis licensees from advertising or marketing cannabis products using merchandise, such as clothing, hats, t-shirts, or other items branded with the name or logo of the product. The bill already passed through the California Senate unanimously, but its constitutionality is questionable.

    The bill is intended to limit marketing of cannabis products in ways that were already conceptually prohibited by AUMA in that a licensee may not advertise a cannabis product in a way intended to encourage people under 21 years of age to consume or purchase cannabis. However, the bill goes beyond just requiring that merchandise may not be made attractive to children and bars, presumably, any branded merchandise.

    The language of the proposed law is extremely broad.  SB162 would amend Section 26152 of the Business and Professions Code to read:

    26152. A licensee shall not do any of the following:

    (a) Advertise or market in a manner that is false or untrue in any material particular, or that, irrespective of falsity, directly, or by ambiguity, omission, or inference, or by the addition of irrelevant, scientific, or technical matter, tends to create a misleading impression.

    (b) Publish or disseminate advertising or marketing containing any statement concerning a brand or product that is inconsistent with any statement on the labeling thereof.

    (c) Publish or disseminate advertising or marketing containing any statement, design, device, or representation which tends to create the impression that the cannabis originated in a particular place or region, unless the label of the advertised product bears an appellation of origin, and such appellation of origin appears in the advertisement.

    (d) Advertise or market on a billboard or similar advertising device located on an Interstate Highway or on a State Highway which crosses the California border.

    (e) Advertise or market cannabis or cannabis products in a manner intended to encourage persons under 21 years of age to consume cannabis or cannabis products. This prohibition includes all advertising of cannabis or cannabis products through the use of branded merchandise, including, but not limited to, clothing, hats, or other merchandise with the name or logo of the product.

    (f) Publish or disseminate advertising or marketing that is attractive to children.

    (g) Advertise or market cannabis or cannabis products on an advertising sign within 1,000 feet of a day care center, school providing instruction in kindergarten or any grades 1 through 12, playground, or youth center.

    (Emphasis added.)  The entire bill is available on the Legislature’s web site, at:

    https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billCompareClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB162

    As of August 1, 2017, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the bill states, “This bill would specify that advertising or marketing cannabis or cannabis products in a manner intended to encourage persons under 21 years of age to consume cannabis or cannabis products includes all advertising of cannabis or cannabis products through the use of branded merchandise, including, but not limited to, clothing, hats, or other merchandise with the name or logo of the product.”

    You read that right—if this becomes law, then cannabis licensees would be prohibited from advertising their brands on any merchandise, even if it was not designed to appeal to minors or even made available to people under the age of 21. The bill cites a case related to tobacco advertising restrictions (Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F.Supp.2d 512 (2010)) in support of the legislature’s position that such a restriction on speech for cannabis would be constitutional. However, there are problems with that comparison.

    First, Commonwealth Brands dealt with a federal law that placed restrictions on advertising, whereas AUMA is a state law. The federal district court’s holding in Commonwealth Brands is not binding on courts in California.

    Second, tobacco and cannabis are not the same thing, nor do they have the same effect on the human body. The court in Commonwealth Brands made only passing references to the government interest being served by the federal law at issue in that case citing the Act’s aim as being “to curb tobacco use by adolescents” (at 519) and reducing tobacco use by minors” (at 522). However, even interests that some may consider intuitively worthy are not self-validating under the law. Rather, the government must prove that the interest is substantial (or, in some cases, compelling). In this instance, the interest put forth in tobacco regulations is substantial because it has been widely accepted, through substantiation of numerous studies, that tobacco use is inherently dangerous in its causation of cancer, heart disease, and other serious health effects. This interest is explicitly referenced in the act regulating the tobacco advertising at issue and therefore implicitly accepted by the court in Commonwealth Brands. That said, there is simply no evidence that the potential harm and therefore the same interest in curbing cannabis use. The government lacks the same or even comparable body of evidence demonstrating that cannabis is carcinogenic or otherwise harmful to one’s health. In fact, a number of recent studies comparing tobacco smokers and cannabis smokers found that cannabis smokers had better long-term health and were less likely to suffer from cancer than tobacco users.

    In addition, unlike in Commonwealth Brands, where the government provided “extensive documentation” to show that marketing of tobacco products had a causal connection on consumer behavior of children, the legislature does not provide any proof that restricting advertising of cannabis products will affect youth behavior. Rather, the current version of SB162 simply states:

    Research by The RAND Corporation indicates that adolescents who are exposed to advertising of cannabis were more likely to report using cannabis or say they planned to use the substance in the future. The American College of Pediatricians’ research has found that cannabis has adverse effects on the adolescent brain and is associated with psychiatric illness and negative social outcomes.

     The bill does not provide any specific studies from either the RAND Corporation or the American College of Pediatricians to support this position, or to demonstrate that restricting speech in this broad way will achieve the desired outcome. Failure to provide the studies presumably demonstrating the government’s interest not only leaves the public in the dark as to what the government posits its substantial interest to be, but also creates a lack of accountability in the manner such interest was substantiated should the public infer or otherwise guess at what the interest might be.

     

    Commercial v. Non-Commercial Speech

    The First Amendment prohibits the government from making any law abridging the freedom of speech. Commercial speech is speech where the speaker is more likely to be engaged in commerce, where the audience consists of actual or potential customers, and where the content of the message is commercial in nature. Admittedly, commercial speech is afforded less protection by the First Amendment than non-commercial speech.

    The test to see whether a restriction on commercial speech violates the First Amendment is outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). First, in order to be protected by the First Amendment, commercial speech must be truthful and not misleading. If the answer is yes, the speech can only be constitutionally regulated if (i) the government has a substantial interest in regulating the speech; (ii) the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (iii) the regulation is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson at 565.

    Additionally, any regulation of speech is void if it is vague, meaning it does not give reasonable notice of what is prohibited, or overbroad, meaning it regulates substantially more speech than is necessary to serve the government interest at stake.

    The government has the burden of demonstrating that the challenged regulation advances its interest in a direct and material way; mere speculation or conjecture that the regulation may serve the interest is not sufficient. There must be a “reasonable fit between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 561 (2001).

    The Commonwealth Brands case seems to rely on the idea that branded merchandise when utilized by the public, even if only those members of the public aged over 21 years, such individuals become walking advertisements to which minors will be inevitably exposed.  While there is some logic to the concept, if taken to its logical conclusion, absolutely no brand affiliated products intended for adults should be visible in the public domain given the likelihood that a minor might encounter them – this ban would include not only tobacco, cannabis, and alcohol, but also to clearly illogical extremes such as pharmaceuticals, cars (which are not to be driven except by individuals aged 16 and older), military careers, and more. Certain, more conservative, portions of the population may well include many more items to such a list.

    In either event, even if such items may seem easily forgone by some, the Supreme Court has already rejected such logic, not only with substantial interests but even the higher bar of compelling interests, and for good reason.  In Lorillard, the Court held that even retailers and manufacturers of adult-oriented products have an interest in conveying truthful information about their products to adults, and adults have a corresponding interest in receiving truthful information about such products. Lorillard at 564. In fact, the Court has reiterated several times that the level of discourse reaching the public simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox, despite the presence of minors and their inevitable exposure to such discourse. To hold otherwise would be to reduce the adult population to reading only what is fit for children. Id (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) and Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,  383 (1957)).

    Purely political speech is given the full protection of the First Amendment, and restrictions on political speech are judged using strict scrutiny, which is the most difficult burden for the government to uphold. There must be a compelling government interest at stake and the government restriction on speech must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. A law is not narrowly tailored if it is over-inclusive, meaning it restricts even speech that does not implicate the government’s interest, or if there is a less restrictive means available to serve the government’s interest. Additionally, government restrictions on the content of speech are judged using this strict scrutiny analysis.

    The constitutionality of non-commercial, content-neutral restrictions of speech are assessed using intermediate scrutiny. This means that the law or restriction must advance an important government interest, and the means chosen must be substantially related to that interest. As is the case with content-based, purely political, or commercial speech, the law cannot be vague or overbroad.

    Additionally, there can’t be what’s called a “prior restraint” on speech, which is a governmental action that prevents speech or expression before it occurs. Prior restraints are typically found to be unconstitutional.

     

    Prohibition on Cannabis Advertising of Bands

    Cannabis companies advertising their brands or products on merchandise would likely fall under the purview of commercial speech, though certain messages could be construed to be non-commercial or even purely political given the fact that the legality of cannabis is currently a topic of political discussion.

    Yet, even if a court were to find that cannabis and cannabis product advertising on merchandise was commercial speech, the restriction would not withstand Central Hudson review. Specifically, the government would not be able to meet the first and final prongs of the test—that the government have a substantial interest to be served and the regulation be not more extensive than necessary to achieve that interest. Here, the State of California may well posit an interest in ensuring that children do not have access to cannabis products made for adults in much the same way that the State has an interest in ensuring youth do not have access to alcoholic beverages; however, the scientific data is entirely lacking to put cannabis on par with tobacco given the severe and undisputed health effects associated with the latter but not the former.

    In addition, prohibiting all cannabis licensees from advertising their company or products on branded merchandise is more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest given the plethora of valid and easily implemented alternatives. There is not a “reasonable fit” here between the objective and the means chosen. Instead, the legislature could restrict marketing that is specifically designed to be attractive to children, or could prohibit cannabis licensees from distributing branded merchandise at locations where children are present. Additionally, self-regulation of the industry is also an option. This method works quite well in the beer industry, where industry-created guidelines exist for branding and marketing by brewers and have thus far prevented the need for outside, legislative restrictions.

    Interestingly, the prohibition on advertising cannabis or cannabis products through branded merchandise would only apply to licensees. This means that someone without a state-issued cannabis license, such as a headshop or unpermitted operator, both of which are more easily accessible by someone under the age of 21, could advertise cannabis products through branded merchandise without repercussion, but someone with a license would be in violation of the law if they did so. This does not seem equitable or in line with the goal of reducing child exposure to branded cannabis merchandise.

    Lastly, the restriction on speech in SB162 is overbroad, as it would regulate substantially more speech than is necessary to achieve the government’s interest in restricting advertisements to minors. Speech that is not targeted in any way towards children, is not sold or distributed in places where children are present, and is not attractive to children would be included in the prohibition. This would impede the ability of cannabis companies to engage in constitutionally protected truthful commercial speech.

    If you’re concerned about this, we encourage you to contact your state assembly member today and tell your representative to vote “NO” on SB 162 unless amended.

    Please contact the Law Offices of Omar Figueroa to learn more about proposed restrictions on cannabis branded products and constitutional challenges thereto.

  • Planning to Hire Local? Be Aware of Employment Laws.

     

    As local authorities begin drafting and, in certain circumstances even finalizing, local ordinances for cannabis licensing, prospective licensees are faced with a number of considerations about how to structure their company so as to optimize the likelihood of obtaining a license. One factor several jurisdictions, such as Sonoma County, have proposed or adopted is giving priority licensing to companies that intend to “hire local.”

    Many cannabis companies instinctively adopt a “local-first” ethos as part of their core values. However, when structuring business operations, companies must keep in mind the myriad local, state, and federal employment laws that affect the way in which it may operate.

    Federal law prohibits companies from denying employment to an individual if the denial is based on certain criteria that are unrelated to one’s ability to perform the job at hand. The federal criteria includes: age, disability, genetic information, harassment, national origin, pregnancy, race or color, religion, and sex.

    However, some states, and even some municipalities, have their own laws that offer even broader protection. California, for example, has additional protected classes upon which an employer may not discriminate in the hiring process. In California, protected categories include: race or color, ancestry or national origin (including language use restrictions), religion or creed, age, mental or physical disabilities, medical condition, genetic information, sex or gender (including pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding or related medical conditions), marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression, or military and veteran status.

    While the federal and state lists inevitably overlap to a certain extent, a company must comply with the most restrictive set of laws applicable to its location. Moreover, the intent of the employer is not the deciding factor when determining whether improper discrimination has occurred. Rather, the fact that a particular practice has the effect of discrimination is sufficient to create a legal issue. This means that even a company with the best of intentions can run afoul of employment laws if otherwise valid practices have the effect of discrimination.

    This issue sometimes arises with respect to local-preference hiring practices.  By way of an example, say a company has adopted a hiring practice whereby they give preference to individuals who live in the same city as the company is headquartered in and that city happens to have a population that is skewed to a particular demographic; the applicant pool is therefore also going to be skewed towards that disproportionate demographic. In such a scenario, if that demographic is skewed with regards to race or ethnicity, for example, the company’s hiring practice has the effect of discriminating based on race and ethnicity. This is true, even if done without the intention to discriminate based on race or ethnicity, but rather to simply benefit “locals,” without regard to race or ethnicity.

    For example, according to the 2010 United States Census, 66.1% of Sonoma County residents self-identified as “White alone, not Hispanic or Latino”, whereas 40.1% of Californians self-identified as “White alone, not Hispanic or Latino.”  On the other hand, 3.% of Sonoma County residents self-identified as “Asian alone”, whereas 13.0% of Californians self-identified as “Asian alone.”  Similarly, 1.6% of Sonoma County residents self-identified as “Black or African American alone”, whereas 6.2% of Californians self-identified as “Black or African American alone.”  In other words, compared to the State of California as a whole, Sonoma County has a greater percentage of individuals self-identifying as  “White alone, not Hispanic or Latino” and a smaller percentage of individuals self-identifying as “Asian alone” or “Black or African American alone.”  Because of these demographic disparities, a hiring plan that favors local applicants (Sonoma County residents) may have the effect of discriminating based on race or ethnicity, even if done without the intention to discriminate.

    When the effect of discrimination arises, an employer may yet avoid liability if it can prove that the hiring criterion was job-related and consistent with business necessity; however, this is a fairly difficult standard of review, especially if reasonable alternatives with a less discriminatory effect exist. As such, companies looking at licensing in areas that have a less-than-varied demographic with regards to any of the protected classes should be wary of a local preference hiring plan and consult with an attorney prior to implementation.

    For more information, visit the California Department of Fair Employment & Housing’s website.

  • Court Update from San Diego in Case of Lawyer Jessica McElfresh

    Court update from the San Diego hearing in the Jessica McElfresh case, which took place on July 7, 2017 in Department 36 on the third floor of the Main Courthouse located at 220 West Broadway, before the Honorable Laura Halgren.

     

    BACKGROUND

    Jessica McElfresh is a well-known San Diego lawyer who has practiced cannabis law for years. She is facing several cannabis-related felony charges, filed by Jorge Del Portillo of the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office after Ms. McElfresh helped secure a tremendous appellate victory in an asset forfeiture case unsuccessfully prosecuted by the same Jorge Del Portillo of the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office. At issue was whether legal documents and digital data seized from attorney McElfresh’s home and office pursuant to the search warrant were protected under the attorney-client privilege.

     

    TAKEAWAY

    The good news is that Judge Halgren will not rely on the federal prohibition on cannabis in deciding claims of privilege, contrary to the prosecution’s position that the federal prohibition on cannabis means that the crime-fraud exception controls. Judge Halgren stated that no further argument is needed on the federal prohibition, as the search warrant was based on purported violations of state law, not federal law, and probable cause was based on an analysis of state and local law. This was a relief to many lawyers present, who were concerned that the Court would go along with the prosecution’s overreaching contention that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege swallowed the privilege entirely because, well, because federal law.

    The Court declined to issue a final ruling on the motions until the special master’s report came in. (A special master is a court-appointed adjudicator of time-consuming issues, in this case, deciding claims of privilege with respect to voluminous documents and electronic files.

    The Court noted that it had not been presented with a declaration from Ms. McElfresh showing that the accused attorney has an immediate need for the return of seized items in order to conduct her law business, hinting that if the Court were to be presented with such a declaration, the Court may be inclined to make a ruling favorable to the defense.

    The next hearing will take place in two weeks, on July 21 at 2:30 p.m. in Department 36 on the third floor of the Main Courthouse located at 220 West Broadway, before the Honorable Laura Halgren.

     

    DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HEARING (FOR LAW GEEKS)

    Defendant Jessica McElfresh was represented by the mighty Eugene Iredale, and the prosecution was represented by Jorge Del Portillo.

    You can compare their listings on the State Bar web site:

    http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/75292

    http://members.calbar.ca.gov/fal/Member/Detail/241474

    The matter was set for a hearing on the accused’s Motions for Return of Property, Narrowing Scope of Search Warrant, Return of Illegally Seized Items, Return of Privileged Material, and Sealing Pending In Camera Review.

    The hearing commenced with about a dozen lawyers entering appearances on behalf of their current clients (clients formerly represented by Jessica McElfresh) to assert the attorney-client privilege. Mr. Iredale agreed to provide the court with a comprehensive list of counsel and clients asserting privilege.

    Judge Halgren noted she is in trial and only had until 10 a.m. She said she did not want to hear more about the timing of the search warrant in relation to the court order issued by Judge Ipema (to return funds seized from co-defendant Slatic in an asset forfeiture proceeding), meaning, she did not want to hear about retaliatory and vindictive prosecution. There was no more discussion of this topic during the hearing.

    Judge Halgren stated that no further argument was needed on the federal prohibition, as the search warrant was based on purported violations of state law, not federal law, and probable cause was based on an analysis of state and local law. This was a relief to many lawyers present, who were concerned that the Court would go along with the prosecution’s overreaching contention that the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client privilege swallowed the privilege entirely simply “because federal law.”

    Judge Halgren did issue a tentative ruling in favor of the defense with respect to medical records pertaining to Ms. McElfresh and her father, who passed away years ago. She said medical records of patients are protected by a right of privacy in the California Constitution, that the search warrant does not encompass such medical records, that there is no basis for overcoming their confidentiality, and that the defense should expect the records to be returned.

    The prosecutor, Mr. Del Portillo, argued that if Ms. McElfresh has a medical marijuana recommendation, or is in possession of recommendations, that is evidence either of an affirmative defense (a reference to the medical cannabis defense, which technically is a limited immunity from prosecution rather than an affirmative defense) or evidence of her joining a criminal conspiracy.

    If Ms. McElfresh is part of a collective, argued Del Portillo, she is part of a conspiracy. Judge Halgren stated that the Court does not see the search warrant as authorizing a search of medical records for defendant’s medical marijuana recommendation, but that the Court will not issue a final ruling until it obtains the special master’s report.

    With regard to the defense challenge to the overbreadth of the search warrant with respect to electronic searches, Judge Halgren stated that the Court did not view the search warrant as authorizing an electronic search term for Ms. McElfresh’s name (and thereby a search of each and every document containing Ms. McElfresh’s name), but rather clarified that the search is to be focused on Ms. McElfresh in connection with the legal entities the Court “found probable cause for.”

    The prosecution gave a status update on the electronic search: the items should be imaged and the originals ready to return by the end of next week, but had yet to be analyzed.   Defense counsel Iredale requested that, before any search takes place, the defense be given a list of search terms, so there is an opportunity for correction “before the bell that cannot be unrung is rung.” The Court ordered the prosecution and defense to meet and confer to try to narrow the execution of the search warrant so that the search does not exceed the scope of the search warrant (interpreted in light of the court’s clarifying statements.)

    Judge Halgren noted that she had not been presented with a declaration from Ms. McElfresh showing that the accused attorney has an immediate need for the return of seized items in order to conduct her law business, hinting that if the Court were to be presented with such a declaration, the Court may be inclined to make a ruling favorable to the defense.

    A discussion ensued about verifying the authenticity of imaged copies of seized digital materials, and the Court suggested that the prosecution should keep the original electronic items and provide an imaged copy to the defense.

    Defense counsel Iredale requested to be given a copy of the special master report in advance of its publication to the prosecution so that the defense would have an opportunity to object to the inadvertent or unintentional disclosure of privileged information in the report (for example, if the special master itemizes a file in a way that discloses the nature of a privileged communication.) The Court suggested the parties meet and confer with the special master, Mr. Martin.

    Mr. Iredale previewed an issue that he wanted to brief more thoroughly: the special master is not allowed to review the contents of seized material, but only to peruse the material in order to categorize it. Prosecutor Mr. Del Portillo said the prosecution disagreed with that position, and argued that when the attorney is a target of a criminal investigation, no special master is required, and that the prosecution had gone above and beyond the call of duty by having a special master. The defense disagreed, of course.

    Judge Halgren stated the Court needed to hear from the special master, Mr. Martin at the next hearing; the Court did not want to guess. At the status hearing on July 21, the Court also wanted to hear from the computer lab about its timetable.

    The Court further stated that — contrary to the prosecution’s position that the crime-fraud exception applies to any attorney-client communications that could be used as evidence of a violation of 11379.6(a) (Manufacturing by means of ethanol extraction) — the search warrant does not allow examination of all client files to see if there’s evidence of criminal activity.

    Finally, Judge Halgren granted Ms. McElfresh permission to travel freely out of state, but would need to obtain a travel order in order to leave the country.

    The next hearing will take place in two weeks, on July 21 at 2:30 p.m. in Department 36 on the third floor of the Main Courthouse located at 220 West Broadway, before the Honorable Laura Halgren.

     

  • Sonoma County body-camera programs: transparent or opaque?

    The Press Democrat

    The video of a September encounter between three deputies and a Boyes Hot Springs couple was so troubling, one of the deputies was out of a job within a week after Sonoma County sheriff’s officials watched it.

    The deputy was shown forcing open a bedroom door and roughly handling a man who refused to get out of bed, according to the Sheriff’s Office, grabbing, pulling, hitting with a baton, shocking with a stun gun and otherwise handling him in a manner prosecutors said rose to the level of felony assault.

    The actions of the former deputy, Scott Thorne, may not have been scrutinized had the deputies not been wearing body cameras, which the Sheriff’s Office began issuing to its 250-member force of uniformed patrol deputies, detectives and sergeants more than 18 months ago.

     But the public has not seen the video from the Sept. 24 incident, and it’s not clear if they ever will.

    (more…)

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  • Reefer Badass

    Bohemian

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  • Protester gets reduced charges; Bypass opponents to converge on Water Board meeting

    Bay Area Coalition for Headwaters

    Update on trial of Caltrans Bypass protester, journalist and Crane-Sitter Will Parrish, scheduled for trial Jan. 28 and facing possible 8 years in jail:      (See Jan. 21, 2014 post)

    After a hearing in Mendocino County Court Jan. 23, a settlement was reached that cancelled the upcoming trial, scheduled for Jan. 28. The particulars of the settlement are:

    *15 of the 17 misdemeanors were dropped, retaining two charges of trespass, which drop to infractions after a probation period of 24 months.

    *100 hours of community service

    *Two years probation, during which entry of judgment is deferred –i.e., sentencing remains open during that time.

    *In addition, a previous violation of a stay-away order was dropped, and the stay-away order was modified so that Parrish can participate in lawful public gatherings at or near the Bypass site. (more…)

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  • Minister seeks return of peyote seized in Santa Rosa

    The Press Democrat

    A minister in the North Coast chapter of the Native American Church says his right to religious freedom was violated when sheriff’s deputies seized mind-altering peyote from his home during a raid on indoor pot gardens.
    Former Santa Rosa resident David Marbain, 56, is seeking the return of nearly 5 pounds of the dried cactus known for its hallucinogenic effects as well as 27 live plants that were taken in the 2010 sweep.

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  • Judge: Video of west county artist’s arrest can stay online

    The Press Democrat

    A Sonoma County judge Thursday rejected prosecutors’ efforts to remove a controversial video from the Internet that shows a Santa Rosa police officer repeatedly punching a prostrate man as he tries to handcuff him.

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  • Mobilizing Help for People Accused of Hacking

    The New York Times

    When Senator Joseph R. McCarthy held hearings in the 1950s to question witnesses about their supposed ties to communism, critics accused him of fomenting a Red Scare hysteria. Decades later, the term Green Scare was used to describe a series of sweeping federal prosecutions of people involved in radical environmental and animal rights groups.

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  • Don’t Call It ‘Pot’ in This Circle; It’s a Profession

    The New York Times

    As more and more states allow medical use of the drug, and California considers outright legalization, marijuana’s supporters are pushing hard to burnish the image of pot by franchising dispensaries and building brands; establishing consulting, lobbying and law firms; setting up trade shows and a seminar circuit; and constructing a range of other marijuana-related businesses.

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